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Vincent: A “Holding Company Exception” to Hertz?

NOTE
A “Holding Company Exception” to Hertz?
3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, 880 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 2018)
Lauren Vincent *

I. INTRODUCTION
Diversity jurisdiction, as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1332, requires that all
persons on one side of a controversy be citizens of different states than all persons on the other side. 1 Specifically, § 1332(c) provides that a corporation is
“a citizen of every State . . . by which it has been incorporated and of the State
. . . where it has its principal place of business.” 2 Defining the phrase “principal
place of business,” however, has proven challenging for the federal courts. 3 As
a result, for several decades, courts developed and applied a plethora of tests
that muddled the question of corporate citizenship, yielding widespread inconsistent results. 4
After the Supreme Court of the United States announced in Hertz Corp.
v. Friend 5 that a corporation’s principal place of business is its “nerve center”
– i.e., its “center of direction, control, and coordination” – the complexity associated with determining a corporation’s principal place of business seemed
to be a thing of the past. 6 Although the Hertz decision brought substantial
clarity to the issue of corporate diversity jurisdiction, its one-size-fits-all test
for determining principal place of business has proven less than straightforward
when applied to modern corporate structures – notably, holding companies.
This Note addresses one perplexing problem that Hertz’s “nerve center” test
failed to anticipate: How should courts determine the “principal place of business” of a corporation that is designed to engage in few, if any, substantial
business activities, such as a holding corporation?
B.S., History Education, Missouri State University, 2016; J.D. Candidate, University
of Missouri School of Law, 2019; Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2018–2019.
I am grateful to Professor Dessem for his insight, guidance, and support during the
writing of this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing
process.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2018); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68
(1996); see also infra notes 59–69 and accompanying text (explaining subject matter
jurisdiction).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1).
3. See infra Section III.B.1.
4. See infra Section III.B.1.
5. 559 U.S. 77 (2010).
6. Id. at 93. Indeed, the Hertz decision extinguished all other preexisting tests
for determining principal place of business. Id. at 96.
*
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Although some attempts have been made to reconcile the unique nature
of holding corporations with Hertz’s “nerve center” test, the federal courts have
begun crafting rules of corporate citizenship that deviate from Hertz precedent
and pronounce new rules for determining the principal place of business of
holding companies. 7 The dangers of such deviation are perfectly showcased
in the 2018 decision of 3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, 8 where the Ninth Circuit held
that a recently-formed holding corporation’s principal place of business can be
located where it simply plans to hold board meetings – regardless of whether
any such meetings have occurred prior to the filing of a lawsuit. 9
This Note argues the Ninth Circuit’s approach to determining the corporate citizenship of a newly-formed holding corporation strays considerably
from Hertz precedent, announces a “holding company exception” to Hertz, 10
and invites small business owners to invent diversity jurisdiction through the
convenient creation of holding corporations just days before filing in federal
court. This Note further argues that a newly-formed holding corporation’s
principal place of business must not be based on where its high level officers
intend to direct, control, and coordinate its activities at a future date but must
instead be based on where its high-level officers are actually directing, controlling, and coordinating its activities at the time a lawsuit is filed. Finally, this
Note considers the ways in which the legislature and the courts can craft and
interpret diversity jurisdiction rules to address the uniqueness of holding corporation structures while remaining true to the holding announced in Hertz.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
A limited liability company known as 3123 SMB LLC (the “LLC”) filed
a legal malpractice action against attorney Steven J. Horn (“Horn”) (the “Lawsuit”) in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California after retaining Horn to represent it in an underlying property damage lawsuit. 11 Due
to the complex nature of the facts in 3123 SMB, LLC v. Horn, this Part proceeds
chronologically in four Sections. First, Section A summarizes the underlying
property damage lawsuit filed in California state court. Second, Section B describes the creation of the LLC and the subsequent termination of Horn’s representation. Third, Section C articulates the formation of Lincoln One CorpoSee, e.g., 3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, 880 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id.
Id. at 471.
Despite the fact that in Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. the Eastern District of Pennsylvania stated, “[T]here is no indication that the Hertz Court intended to
create a ‘holding company exception’ to its admonition that a corporation has only one
nerve center,” this Note argues that this is precisely what the Third Circuit did in affirming the Eastern District’s judgment on appeal. 853 F. Supp. 2d 487, 495 (E.D. Pa.
2012), aff’d, 724 F.3d 337 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Further, this Note argues
that this is what the Ninth Circuit did in its decision of 3123 SMB LLC.
11. Id. at 463–64.
7.
8.
9.
10.
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ration (the “Corporation”) – a holding corporation. Lastly, Section D concludes this Part with a summary of the legal malpractice lawsuit that is the
subject of the diversity jurisdiction issue presented in the 3123 SMB, LLC v.
Horn.

A. The Underlying Property Damage Lawsuit
In July of 2008, Anthony Kling and his mother, Mary Kling, brought suit
against multiple defendants, 12 claiming a nearby construction project was responsible for causing subsidence damage to an apartment building they owned
in Santa Monica, California. 13 The Klings retained Horn, a California attorney,
to represent them in the dispute and filed their complaint in Los Angeles Superior Court. 14

B. The Creation of 3123 SMB LLC and Horn’s Termination
In July of 2011, three years after the original filing of their property suit,
the Klings organized the LLC 15 in Missouri and listed its place of business as
Clayton, Missouri. 16 The Klings resided in California, but they claimed to have
family and business connections in Missouri. 17 The Klings transferred their
ownership of the Santa Monica property to the LLC. 18 The LLC’s sole business activity was to manage the lawsuits that arose over the destruction of the
Santa Monica property, and the Klings were the only persons authorized to act
on the LLC’s behalf. 19

12. Id. at 464 (citing Kling v. Hassid, No. B261391, 2016 WL 538238, at *1 n.2
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2016). The named defendants were “Joseph Hassid, Santa Monica Investments, LLC, and Bay Cities Discount Kitchen and Appliances, Inc.” Kling
v. Hassid, No. B261391, 2016 WL 538238, at *1 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2016). “In
October 2008, [the Klings] amended their complaint to name Gabai [Construction,
LLC,] as a defendant.” Kling v. Gabai Constr., No. B235367, 2012 WL 5458924, at
*1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2012).
13. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 463; see also Gabai, 2012 WL 5458924, at *1.
14. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 463.
15. “A limited liability company (LLC) is a hybrid business entity that offers its
members limited liability as if they were shareholders of a corporation[] but treats the
entity and its members as a partnership for tax purposes.” Ann. K Wooster, Annotation,
Construction and Application of Limited Liability Company Acts – Issues Relation to
Formation of Limited Liability Company and Addition or Disassociation of Members
Thereto, 43 A.L.R. 6th 611, West (database updated weekly).
16. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 464.
17. Id.
18. Id. In May 2013, the Klings amended their original complaint in the property
damage lawsuit and added the LLC as a new party plaintiff in all remaining state court
litigation. Id.
19. Id.
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In October of 2013, the LLC terminated Horn’s representation after Horn
failed to comply with certain California local court rules. 20 As a result of
Horn’s errors, the trial court dismissed the LLC’s case with prejudice for failure to bring the action to trial within five years – which is a violation of California Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310. 21

C. The Incorporation of Lincoln One
In September of 2014, roughly one year after the LLC terminated Horn’s
representation, Mary Kling organized the Corporation. 22 The Corporation’s
Missouri attorney filed the necessary articles of incorporation and listed his
office in Clayton, Missouri, as Mary Kling’s address. 23 Shortly after its incorporation, the Corporation became the sole member of the LLC. 24 Mary Kling
served as the Corporation’s president, secretary, and only high-level officer;
Anthony Kling served as a board member. 25 The Corporation’s sole business
was “to provide direction to [the LLC],” which included prosecution of the
lawsuits concerning the damage done to the Klings’ Santa Monica property. 26
The Corporation’s articles of incorporation specified that its board meetings
would occur in Clayton, Missouri. 27

D. The Legal Malpractice Lawsuit: 3123 SMB LLC v. Horn
Twenty-five days after the Corporation’s incorporation, the LLC filed the
Lawsuit. 28 The LLC’s complaint alleged the Central District of California had
subject matter jurisdiction to hear its case because the parties were of diverse
20. Id.; see Kling v. Hassid, No. B261391, 2016 WL 538238, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Feb. 10, 2016). According to the LLC, certain exhibits proffered by Horn for a “Long
Cause Binder,” required by California law, were “incomplete, inadequate, and did not
allow the case to be properly prepared for trial.” 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 463–64.
21. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 464; see Hassid, 2016 WL 538238, at *1; see also
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 583.310 (West 2018).
22. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 464. Under California law, legal malpractice
claims must be brought within one year of their discovery to fall within the proper
statute of limitations. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.6(a) (West 2018); see also Lee
v. Hanley, 354 P.3d 334, 336–37 (Cal. 2015).
23. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 464. All of Lincoln One’s corporate records were
kept in the Missouri attorney’s Clayton office. Id. at 465.
24. Id. at 464.
25. Id. Anthony Kling owns seventy-five percent of the Corporation’s shares, and
Mary Kling owns the remaining twenty-five percent. Id.
26. Id. at 465.
27. Id. at 473; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 351.225.1(1) (2016); MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT § 7.01(b) (ABA 2016) (providing that a corporation’s “principal office” as designated in its annual report is its location of annual meetings if not otherwise specified);
cf., e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 600(a) (West 2018); N.Y. BUS. CORP. L. § 602(a) (McKinney 2017).
28. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 465; see id. at 467.
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citizenship. 29 According to the LLC, Horn was properly a citizen of California
and the LLC was properly a citizen of Missouri because its sole member at the
time the Lawsuit was filed – the Corporation – was properly a citizen of Missouri. 30
The Corporation did not engage in any “fundamental daily real estate
business operations” when the LLC filed the Lawsuit. 31 Indeed, the Corporation’s only conceded business operation was to hold an annual meeting in Clayton, Missouri, at which it planned to approve directors and officers, modify
bylaws, and issue stock. 32 Although the Corporation’s annual board meetings
were described as taking place annually, no such meetings had been held at the
time the Lawsuit was filed. 33 Neither Anthony nor Mary Kling visited Missouri between the date of the Corporation’s incorporation and the filing of the
Lawsuit. 34 In October of 2015, subsequent to the filing of the Lawsuit, the
Corporation held one board meeting in Clayton, Missouri. 35
Horn moved to dismiss the Lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
arguing that, under the “nerve center” test set forth by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Hertz Corp v. Friend, the Corporation was properly a citizen of California. 36 In so arguing, Horn relied on the following language of
the Court from Hertz:
[I]f the alleged ‘nerve center’ [of a corporation] is nothing more than a
mail drop box, a bare office with a computer, or the location of an annual executive retreat, the court should instead take as the true ‘nerve
center’ the place of actual direction, control, and coordination . . . . 37

29. Complaint ¶¶ 2–3, 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d 461 (2:14-cv-08115); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2018) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is
between . . . citizens of different States.”).
30. Appellant’s Brief at 6, 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d 461 (No. 16-55304), 2016
WL 4208228, at *6; see also GMAC Commercial Credit LLC v. Dillard Dep’t Stores,
Inc., 357 F.3d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n LLC’s citizenship is that of its members
for diversity jurisdiction purposes . . . .”); Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731
(7th Cir. 1998). See generally Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185 (1990) (concluding that, unless Congress otherwise provides, members of an LLC are citizens for
diversity purposes).
31. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 465.
32. Id.
33. Defendant-Appellee Steven Horn’s Answering Brief at 2, 3123 SMB LLC, 880
F.3d 461 (No. 16–55304), 2016 WL 5929180, at 2 [hereinafter Horn’s Answering
Brief] (“[T]he only evidence of any [Corporation] activity is Missouri is a single board
meeting that occurred well after this case was filed . . . .”).
34. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 467; see also Horn’s Answering Brief, supra note
33, at 7, 20.
35. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 464.
36. See Horn’s Answering Brief, supra note 33, at 29–30.
37. Id. at 14 (quoting Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010)).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 13

1128

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

On this foundation, Horn argued the Corporation’s incorporation in Missouri and intent to hold board meetings in Clayton, Missouri, sometime in the
future was not enough to establish its corporate nerve center in Missouri. 38
According to Horn, the LLC’s principal place of business for purposes of diversity jurisdiction must have been California because the LLC provided no
evidence that Mary Kling directed its activity from Missouri or anywhere besides California. 39 Therefore, because Horn was also a citizen of California,
Horn argued the case was not between diverse parties and could not be heard
in federal district court pursuant to the diversity jurisdiction requirements set
forth in § 1332. 40
The LLC opposed Horn’s motion to dismiss the Lawsuit. 41 Because the
Corporation’s sole business purpose was managing lawsuits, the LLC argued
that the Corporation’s activities “took place in conjunction with its outside
counsel due to the narrow nature of its activities.” 42 Put another way, the LLC
argued that because its attorney is a citizen of Missouri, it, too, should be considered a citizen of Missouri.
The Central District of California agreed with Horn and dismissed the
Lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 43 concluding that California rather than Missouri was the Corporation’s principal place of business under
Hertz’s “nerve test.” 44 The court found that there was “no evidence that any
of the operations of [the Corporation] are directed, controlled, or coordinated
from Missouri or anywhere else other than California[;]” that Mary Kling – the
only officer of the Corporation – was a resident of California and did not travel
to Missouri with regularity; that the LLC’s attempt to rely on corporate documentation to establish the Corporation’s principal place of business was, without more, insufficient proof that the Corporation’s nerve center was in Missouri; and that it was “completely implausible” that the Corporation had not
taken any actions in the twenty-five days of its existence. 45
The court also rejected the LLC’s argument that because the Corporation’s sole business purpose is managing lawsuits, the location of its outside
attorney should definitively establish its principal place of business for diversity purposes. 46 Relying on the nerve test adopted by the Court in Hertz, the
Central District of California reiterated that the actions of the Corporation’s
“high level officers” control the principal place of business analysis rather than
Id. at 22.
Id. at 20.
See id. at 30–31.
Id. at 7.
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 30, at 13.
3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, No. CV 14–8115 DSF, 2016 WL 2594625 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 16, 2016) (mem.).
44. 3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, No. CV 14–8115 DSF (FFMx), 2016 WL 6275168,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2016), rev’d, 880 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 2018).
45. Id.
46. Id.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
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the location of outside persons the Corporation may hire. 47 The court concluded that the LLC had not established diversity jurisdiction and granted
Horn’s motion to dismiss accordingly. 48 Notably, the court did not make any
finding of jurisdictional manipulation. 49
The LLC appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
arguing the Central District of California erred in dismissing its case for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction because the parties were, in fact, diverse in citizenship. 50 The LLC reiterated its argument that under Hertz’s “nerve center”
test, what very little business the Corporation did was done in Missouri and
that, as a result, Missouri must be the location of the Corporation’s principal
place of business. 51 Horn maintained that because the LLC failed to establish
complete diversity existed with competent proof, the Central District of California’s decision to dismiss the Lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
was “manifestly correct.” 52
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Central District of California’s jurisdictional dismissal, finding that the LLC presented competent evidence that the
Corporation’s minimal activity was directed from board meetings in Missouri,
even though no such board meetings had been held prior to the filing of the
Lawsuit. 53 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit found that Missouri was indeed the
Corporation’s – and, therefore, also the LLC’s – appropriate principal place of
business for diversity jurisdiction purposes. 54 The Ninth Circuit stated that its
reversal was conditional, however, and advised that the Central District of California was “free to consider whether there [wa]s jurisdictional manipulation
or an alter ego relationship between [the Corporation] and [the LLC]” on remand. 55

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 3123 SMB LLC, the Ninth Circuit relied primarily on its own interpretation of Hertz to reach the decision that a holding corporation’s principal place
of business is where it holds its board meetings, even if those meetings have
yet to occur. First, as a means of placing the Ninth Circuit’s holding in context,
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 30, at 6.
Id. at 8, 11.
Horn’s Answering Brief, supra note 33, at 30–31.
3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, 880 F.3d 461, 471 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id.
Id. The alter ego doctrine allows a court to “pierce the corporate veil” and toss
aside the norms of “treat[ing] a corporation as an entity distinct from its shareholders”
if there is evidence that the corporation exerts a heightened level of control over its
subsidiary. Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under
Federal Common Law, 95 Hᴀʀᴠ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 853, 853–54 (1982); see discussion infra Section III.C.1.
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this Part addresses the constitutional and statutory bases for federal jurisdiction. Second, this Part examines how corporations fit within that federal jurisdictional framework and discusses the Hertz decision, as well as its ramifications. Finally, this Part examines how a holding corporation’s principal place
of business has been determined in the post-Hertz era.

A. The Jurisdictional Framework in the Federal Courts
Jurisdiction is a threshold question of whether a federal court has the
power to hear a particular case or controversy. 56 It “depends upon the state of
things at the time of the action brought.” 57 This means that a court cannot
consider the location or status of the parties at any time beyond the date the
pleadings are filed. 58
While state courts have the power to hear all cases – except those that
must be heard exclusively in other courts – and are considered courts of “general or universal jurisdiction,” 59 federal courts are courts of limited subjectmatter jurisdiction. 60 Federal courts only have the power to hear cases that (1)
fall within the limits of judicial power granted to them by Article III of the
Constitution 61 and (2) have been assigned to them by a congressional jurisdictional grant of authority. 62
56. Dustin M. Dow, Note, The Unambiguous Supremacy Clause, 53 B.C. L. REV.
1009, 1017 (2012); see also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979) (explaining the distinctions between jurisdiction, standing, and cause of action); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 175 (1803).
57. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570 (2004) (citation
omitted).
58. See id.
59. 12 MICHAEL D. MURRAY, MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES: JURISDICTION, VENUE,
LIMITATIONS § 8:381, West (database updated Aug. 2018). For example, the federal
courts alone have jurisdiction over “cases in which the United States is a party,” “cases
involving violations of the Constitution or federal law,” crimes on federal land, and
bankruptcy cases. Federal vs. State Courts – Key Differences, FINDLAW, https://litigation.findlaw.com/legal-system/federal-vs-state-courts-key-differences.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2018).
60. 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
JURISPRUDENCE § 3522, West (database updated Sept. 2018).
61. U.S. CONST. art. III.
62. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 3552.
The Constitution provides that the ‘judicial Power shall extend’ to ‘Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States’ . . . . Th[e] language [of Art. III,
§ 2] . . . does not automatically confer diversity jurisdiction upon the federal
courts. Rather, it authorizes Congress to do so and, in doing so, to determine
the scope of the federal courts’ jurisdiction within constitutional limits.

Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 84 (2010)).
Because the Constitution explicitly limits the power of the federal courts, Congress may
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Jurisdiction is most commonly conferred on the federal courts through a
party’s invocation of federal question or diversity jurisdiction. 63 Federal question jurisdiction exists when the plaintiff’s cause of action arises under federal
law. 64 Diversity jurisdiction exists when a controversy involves citizens of
different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 – even if the
plaintiff’s cause of action arises solely under state law. 65 Diversity jurisdiction
was primarily created to protect out-of-state defendants against local bias and
prejudice. 66 To effectuate this purpose, complete diversity requires that the

not extend the power it grants to federal district courts beyond the scope of Article III.
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922).
63. See Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1829,
1854–55 (2007) (discussing that a federal court may also have jurisdiction in limited
circumstances other than federal question and diversity cases, such as admiralty cases);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018) (federal question jurisdiction); id. § 1332 (diversity
jurisdiction).
64. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. (extending judicial power “to all cases, in law
and equity, arising under . . . the laws of the United States.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(“[D]istrict courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). Federal question jurisdiction is
generally triggered when a “well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law
creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on
resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983); see also Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153–54 (1908). However, federal question jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this Note and will not be discussed further.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1332; see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending judicial power
“to Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States.”); see also Collins, supra
note 63, at 1830–31. Diversity jurisdiction requires that the amount in controversy
exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
66. Ho v. Ikon Office Sols., Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2001)
(“The primary purpose of the diversity statute is to avoid prejudice against ‘outsiders’
. . . . The Congress that provided for diversity jurisdiction was concerned that a local
jury sitting in state court might exhibit bias in favor of a ‘local’ party who was suing an
out-of-state party. Because federal courts draw from a wider jury pool, . . . federal
court, so the theory goes, provides a more neutral forum.”); see Caitlin Sawyer, Note,
Don’t Dissolve the “Nerve Center”: A Status-Linked Citizenship Test for Principal
Place of Business, 55 B.C. L. REV. 641, 646 & n.38 (2014); see also U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending judicial power “to controversies . . . between Citizens of different States”); Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 352 F.3d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating
that one rationale underlying diversity jurisdiction is to “allow defendants to flee the
state courts”); Rooney v. Tyson, 127 F.3d 295, 297 n.1 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he object
of diversity jurisdiction [is to present] the actual parties to a litigation with a neutral,
federal, playing field.”).
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opposing parties be citizens of different states. 67 Neither Article III of the Constitution nor § 1332, however, explicitly mention corporations. 68 As a result,
courts have expressed some uncertainty over how corporations should be
treated for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. 69

B. Diversity Jurisdiction and the Evolution of the Federal Court’s
Treatment of Corporations
“A corporation is an inanimate entity . . . .” 70 When a group of persons
establish themselves in accordance with certain legal rules, they collectively
become an “artificial being” with a distinct legal personality. 71 Originally, the
Supreme Court of the United States concluded a corporation in and of itself
was “certainly not a citizen” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction; a corporation was instead a “mere legal entity” whose jurisdiction depended on the citizenship of each of its individuals members. 72 Prior to 1958, courts adhered to
the “forum doctrine,” which provided “that if a suit was brought by or against
a corporation with multiple states of incorporation in one of its states of incorporation, . . . the [corporation] would be treated as if it were only a citizen of
the forum state” for diversity purposes. 73 This view created a high potential

67. 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (1806), overruled
in part by Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497
(1844), superseded by statute, Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18
Stat. 470, 470–71 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332). See generally Gilbert v. David,
235 U.S. 561 (1915); Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646 (1878). “A person is considered
a citizen of a state if that person is domiciled within the state and is a citizen of the
United States.” WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 3611.
68. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 3623.
69. Id.
70. Francis C. Amendola et al., 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 1, West (database updated Sept. 2018).
71. Id.
72. Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 86, 91–92 (1809), overruled in
part by Letson, 43 U.S. 497, superseded by statute, Jurisdiction and Removal Act of
1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470–71 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2018));
see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 3522.
73. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 3626. For example,
if a Massachusetts citizen had sued a Delaware and Massachusetts corporation
in a federal court in Delaware, diversity would have existed because the corporation would have been considered a citizen solely of Delaware; however, if the
action had been brought in a Massachusetts federal court, there would have been
no diversity because the suit would have been treated as one between two Massachusetts citizens.

Id.
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for abuse, however, as a corporation could easily attain a federal forum by
merely reincorporating in a different state. 74
Courts abandoned the forum doctrine in 1958 when Congress added §
1332(c) to title 28 of the United States Code, which provides that a corporation
is a citizen of (1) any state in which it is incorporated and (2) the state where
its principal place of business is located. 75 This “dual citizenship” standard
was created as a way of reducing the number of corporate cases heard in the
federal courts on the basis of diversity citizenship, 76 therefore easing the workload of federal judges 77 and preventing frauds on and abuses of federal jurisdiction. 78 The creation of dual citizenship for corporations also “reflected the
reality that a corporation is unlikely to suffer out-of-state prejudice if it has its
principal place of business in that state.” 79 Determining a corporation’s state
of incorporation is a straight-forward inquiry, but uncovering a corporation’s
principal place of business has always presented a complex inquiry for the federal courts – in both the pre-Hertz and post-Hertz legal landscape.

1. Determining Principal Place of Business Before Hertz
In the years following the enactment of § 1332(c) and before Hertz was
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, federal courts consulted
74. See, e.g., Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab
& Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928) (finding a business was incorporated in one state
for the sole purpose of forming a contract with a railroad company located in another
state and to create diversity of citizenship and jurisdiction in the federal courts), superseded by Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010). Reincorporation in another state
is a relatively easy process and most states provide step-by-step information about how
to file the necessary paperwork for incorporation, most of which can be done online.
See, e.g., Starting a Business, MO. SECRETARY OF ST., https://www.sos.mo.gov/business/corporations/startbusiness (last visited Oct. 23, 2018).
75. Pub. L. No. 85–554 § 2, 72 Stat 415 (1958) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (c)). Note that an individual is considered a citizen of the state in which she is
domiciled under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The definitional difference between the citizenship of individuals and the citizenship of corporations is
thought to “reflect[] the reality that a corporation may have a presence sufficient to
render it a ‘citizen’ of more than one state.” Sawyer, supra note 66, at 646.
76. Kelly v. U.S. Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 852 (3d. Cir. 1960). See generally
Canton v. Angelina Cas. Co., 279 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1960); Nat’l Spinning Co. v. Washington, 312 F. Supp. 958 (E.D.N.C. 1970); Knee v. Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc.,
293 F. Supp. 1094, 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Carter v. Clear Fir Sales Co., 284 F. Supp.
386 (D. Or. 1967).
77. Egan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 324 F.2d 565, 565 (2d Cir. 1963); Gilardi v.
Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 189 F. Supp. 82, 85 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
78. Gilardi, 189 F. Supp. at 85–86. For example, the “principal place of business”
provision was necessary to remedy situations in which a wholly-local operation was
deemed a citizen of a foreign state for diversity purposes merely because it happened
to be incorporated there. Id.
79. Sawyer, supra note 66, at 647; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 3624.
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several multifactor tests when determining a corporation’s principal place of
business. 80 The following tests were predominantly employed by the courts in
the pre-Hertz era: (1) the “center of corporate activity” test; 81 (2) the “nerve
center” test; 82 and (3) the facts-and-circumstances-based “total activity” test,
which represented a hybrid of the center of corporate activity and nerve center
tests. 83 After analyzing the structure and activities of the corporation at issue,
a federal court would select the test that seemed best suited to its inquiry of the
“corporation’s center of gravity” and apply it accordingly. 84 Courts differed
somewhat in their formulation and application of these tests, which produced
inconsistent results. 85
Although the multifactor tests provided the courts with flexibility in determining a corporation’s principal place of business, such flexibility came “at
the expense of uniformity, predictability, and administrative simplicity.” 86 The
Supreme Court of the United States’ landmark decision of Hertz Corp. v.

80. Sawyer, supra note 66, at 648.
81. Id. at 649. The “center of corporate activity” test concluded that a corpora-

tion’s principal place of business was the place where a corporation’s assets and dayto-day operations could be physically found. Id. This test focused primarily on visible,
substantial operations of a corporation in a given state and was usually applied if a
corporation had relatively centralized activities in one or a few states rather than spread
across multiple states. See, e.g., Grand Union Supermarkets of the Virgin Islands, Inc.
v. H.E. Lockhart Mgmt., Inc., 316 F.3d 408, 411 (3d Cir. 2003). “This test was sometimes referred to as the ‘place of operations’ or the ‘corporate operations’ test.” Sawyer, supra note 66, at 648 n.54. In the First Circuit, this approach became the “locus
of operations” test. Id.
82. Sawyer, supra note 66, at 648. The nerve center was defined as the location
“from which [a corporation’s] officers direct, control, and coordinate” activities “in the
furtherance of the corporate objective.” Id. at 649 (citing Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). “[C]ourts reasoned that the
nerve center test should apply when the center of corporate activity test failed to identify the state in which the corporation was least likely to suffer prejudice in state courts.”
Id.
83. Id. Courts employed the total activity test to assess “the totality of the corporate existence.” Id. Federal courts reasoned that the total activity test permitted flexibility “to account for differing activities and structures among corporations.” Id. The
implementation of this test was widely contested among federal courts of appeals, however. E.g., id. at 650 n.70; Teal Energy USA, Inc. v. GT, Inc., 369 F.3d 873, 876 (5th
Cir. 2004); Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Russellville Steel Co., 367 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir.
2004), abrogated by Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010); Gadlin v. Sybron Int’l
Corp., 222 F.3d 797, 799 (10th Cir. 2000); Gafford v. Gen. Electric Co., 997 F.2d 150,
162–63 (6th Cir. 1993), abrogated by Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. 77; see also WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 60, § 3624.
84. Sawyer, supra note 66, at 648.
85. Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Determination of Corporation’s Principal Place
of Business for Purposes of Diversity Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C.A. Section 1332(c),
6 A.L.R. Fed. 436, West (database updated weekly).
86. Sawyer, supra note 66, at 650 (citing Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 92).
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Friend in 2010 addressed these competing benefits and expenses and announced a uniform rule for courts to follow when tasked with making corporate
citizenship determinations.

2. Hertz Corp. v. Friend and the “Nerve Center” Test for Determining
Principal Place of Business
In 2010, the Supreme Court of the United States stated a clear rule for
determining a corporation’s principal place of business in Hertz Corp. v.
Friend. 87 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stephen G. Breyer announced that the appropriate test for determining the principal place of business
was the “nerve center” approach, 88 which the Court believed would usually be
found at the place where a corporation’s “high level officers direct, control,
and coordinate the corporation’s activities” or at the corporation’s headquarters. 89 In so holding, the Court expressly excluded the various preexisting multifactor approaches. 90
Two fundamental rationales underpinned the Court’s determination that
the “nerve center” test was superior to the preexisting tests. 91 First, the Court
reasoned that only one “prominent” place of business (i.e., “a single, determinable location within a state”) 92 was contemplated by the text of § 1332(c)(1). 93
The Court further explained that this “prominent” location is not found in the
state where the corporation enjoys its highest volume of business activity but
is instead found in the state where the corporation’s headquarters is located. 94
Second, the Court stressed the importance of announcing a simple rule
for corporate diversity jurisdiction that produces an efficient and predictable
result, thus benefitting both the federal courts and corporations. 95 The Court
noted that administrative simplicity is a “major virtue in a jurisdictional statute
. . . [because c]omplex jurisdictional tests complicate a case, eating up time
and money as the parties litigate, not the merits of their claims, but which court

87. 559 U.S. 77.
88. In announcing the “nerve center” test, the Court essentially adopted the “nerve

center” test first announced by the Southern District of New York in Scot Typewriter
Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 864–65 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
89. See Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 88.
90. Id. at 92–93.
91. Id. at 93. Some scholars suggest that the Hertz Court provided a third rationale
or consideration for deeming the “nerve center” test superior to other possibilities: legislative history. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 3624.
92. Sawyer, supra note 66, at 651.
93. Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 93. The statute references that “a corporation [is]
deemed a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated”
but only of “the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.” 28
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2018) (emphasis added).
94. Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 93.
95. Id. at 94.
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is right to decide those claims.” 96 The Court advised, however, that ease of
administration should not come at the expense of locating the “place of actual
direction, control, and coordination” of a corporation. 97 The Court also cautioned against the potential for jurisdictional manipulation, stating that if “the
alleged ‘nerve center’ is nothing more than a mail drop box, a bare office with
a computer, or the location of an annual executive retreat . . . ,” then the true
nerve center should be “the place of actual direction control and coordination.” 98

C. The Problem with Defining a Holding Corporation’s Principal
Place of Business Under Hertz
The inherent difficulties in defining a corporation’s principal place of
business under § 1332(c)(1) and in applying Hertz’s nerve center test are intensified by the abundance of corporate structures that exist in the twenty-firstcentury business world. 99 The Hertz Court anticipated such difficulties and
forewarned that the “nerve center” test it adopted will not “automatically generate a result” in all instances. 100 The Hertz Court further accepted that the use
of a “nerve center” test may sometimes “produce results that seem to cut
against the basic rationale” for the diversity statute but stated that “accepting
occasional[] counterintuitive results is the price the legal system must pay to
avoid overly complex jurisdictional administration . . . .” 101
Notwithstanding this dicta, in the years following the Hertz decision, federal courts have expressed uncertainty about whether Hertz precedent controls
the principal place of business inquiry as applied to certain complex corporate
structures in modern business. 102 In the same vein, the question of whether
holding corporations in particular can be fairly analyzed according to Hertz’s

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 97.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 96 (observing that the principal place of business is less clear when
the corporation’s headquarters is located in one state but its most visible activities occur
in a different state); see also John T. Mitchell, Home Is Where the Nerve Center Is:
Locating a Corporation’s Principal Place of Business, GPSOLO, Oct./Nov. 2011, at 36,
37–38 (observing that it is often difficult to locate the physical location of management’s decisions – particularly when a corporation’s meetings occur by teleconference); Cent. W. Va. Energy Co., Inc. v. Mountain State Carbon, LLC, 636 F.3d 101,
107 n.3 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he proliferation of complex corporate structures among
business enterprises may compel further attention to the issue of ‘principal place of
business’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.”).
100. Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 95–96.
101. Id. at 96.
102. Cent. W. Va. Energy Co., 636 F.3d at 107 n.3 (“We recognize that the proliferation of complex corporate structures among business enterprises may compel further
attention to the issue of ‘principal place of business’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.”).
96.
97.
98.
99.
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nerve center test has been called into question. 103 This Section first describes
the nature of holding corporations and the relationship they have to limited
liability companies and then analyzes how the lower federal courts have conducted the principal place of business inquiry with respect to them.

1. The Nature of Holding Corporations
A holding corporation is “a corporation organized to hold the shares of
another or other corporations.” 104 These shares are frequently held in limited
liability companies. 105 “[T]he dominant characteristic of a holding company
is the ownership of securities by which it is possible to control or substantially
to influence the policies and management of one or more operating companies
in a particular field of enterprise.” 106
As of 2018, an increasing number of small business owners are formulating businesses according to the “holding company” structure. 107 A holding
corporation can hardly be characterized as operating a normal business because
it is designed to simply hold interest in other companies and has no principal
103. See id.
104. 6A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS

§ 2821, West (database updated Sept. 2018). A holding corporation, commonly called
an umbrella company or parent company, is one that “owns a controlling interest in
another company, called a subsidiary” or limited liability company. Jean Murray,
Should I Form a Holding Company for My Businesses?, BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/should-i-form-a-holding-company-for-my-businesses-3974575 (last updated Oct. 6, 2018).
105. Joshua Kennon, Understanding a Holding Company: A Basic Introduction to
Holding Companies & How They Work, https://www.thebalance.com/understanding-aholding-company-357341 (last updated Oct. 16, 2018). The shares could also be held
in limited partnerships, private equity funds, hedge funds, publicly traded stocks,
bonds, real estate, song rights, brand names, patents, trademarks, copyrights, or virtually anything else with value. Id.
106. FLETCHER, supra note 104, § 2821 (quoting N. Am. Co. v. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, 327 U.S. 686, 701 (1946)).
107. See Murray, supra note 104. There are several reasons that a holding company
structure is appealing in the modern business world. See Jim Woodruff, The Advantages of a Holding Company, https://smallbusiness.chron.com/advantages-holdingcompany-24217.html (last updated June 29, 2018). Because the holding company
structure allows for ownership and control of many different companies, a holding company will likely be able to obtain certain tax-free dividends, depending on what percentage of ownership an investor holds. Id. In addition, holding companies may benefit
from reduced risk exposure – as compared to a traditional business model – because
the only risk the holding company has is the capital it invested at the outset. See id.
The holding company also often benefits from the goodwill and reputation of the other
companies it owns and controls while being sheltered from risks faced by the other
companies in the case of legal issues, tax liabilities, and lawsuits. See id. Further, the
creation of a holding company provides several perks related to the diversity of assets,
increased raising of capital, borrowing and lending money with the other companies,
and corporate policymaking. Id.
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place of business in way the term is commonly construed. Despite its unusually
low levels of activity, however, a holding corporation continues to legally exist, and the nature of its structure raises important questions regarding jurisdictional citizenship.
The relationship between a holding corporation and a limited liability
company is rather unique. A limited liability company is treated as a partnership rather than a corporation in the eyes of the law, and its citizenship is determined by the citizenship of its members. 108 Thus, in determining a limited
liability company’s principal place of business for diversity jurisdiction purposes, a court must look to the citizenship of each of its members. 109 Because
a holding corporation is frequently the sole member of a limited liability company, a holding corporation’s citizenship often plays a controlling role in determining the citizenship of a limited liability company.
Generally, a holding corporation has a separate corporate existence from
its operating companies and is to be treated as a separate entity, despite its
aforementioned ability to exert control or influence over those companies. 110
But if the holding company was created as “a mere sham” or if the holding
company’s organization and control indicates that it is simply an instrumentality of another corporation – otherwise referred to as an “alter ego” – then the
holding company will not be viewed as having a legally separate identity and
will take on the citizenship of the company over which it exerts control. 111

2. The Principal Place of Business Problem for Holding Corporations
After Hertz
Few federal court decisions have addressed how the “atypical factual scenario” 112 presented in cases that involve holding corporations should be
squared with Hertz precedent. Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit is the only federal appellate court to grapple with Hertz’s application to
holding corporations as of the time this Note was written. This Section examines the Third Circuit’s decision in Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. 113
In Johnson, two joint plaintiffs filed a personal injury action against a
defendant limited liability company (“GSK LLC”) with a holding company

108. Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 420 (3d Cir. 2010);
Brewer v. SmithKline Beacham Corp., 774 F. Supp. 2d 720, 725 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
109. Zambelli, 592 F.3d at 420; Brewer, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
110. FLETCHER, supra note 104, § 2821.
111. Id.; see also Danjaq, S.A. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 979 F.2d 772, 775 (9th
Cir. 1992) (discussing the possibility of an alter ego relationship between a holding
company and a subsidiary).
112. Brewer, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
113. 724 F.3d 337 (3d Cir. 2013).
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(“GSK Holdings”) as it single member. 114 One plaintiff was a citizen of Louisiana. 115 The other plaintiff was a citizen of Pennsylvania. 116 The citizenship
of GSK Holdings and – by extension – GSK LLC was disputed by the parties. 117 GSK Holdings was incorporated in Delaware but engaged in very limited activities in that state. 118 GSK Holdings’ three-person board of directors
held short (fifteen-to-thirty minute) quarterly board meetings in Wilmington,
Delaware, with some members appearing telephonically. 119 At the time the
Johnson lawsuit was filed, GSK Holdings had conducted approximately forty
board meetings. 120
The extent of the actual decision-making that occurred at GSK Holdings’
board meetings was disputed by the parties. 121 The plaintiffs argued the board
meetings served “merely to ratify decisions” that were actually made in Pennsylvania and that diversity jurisdiction was improper. 122 The defendants maintained GSK Holdings’ directors “reached decisions about [the corporation’s]
investments only at [the Wilmington, Delaware,] board meetings and based on
their own independent judgment” and that diversity jurisdiction was proper. 123
The Third Circuit agreed with the defendants, holding that GSK Holdings’
principal place of business, or “nerve center,” was Delaware because the “‘single direction’ in which the nerve center test points [wa]s towards the location
of [the holding company’s decisions to adopt binding resolutions affecting the
corporation’s investments].” 124 Thus, by extension, the Third Circuit held that
GSK LLC’s principal place of business was also Delaware. 125
The plaintiffs relied on a “delegation theory” to support their position that
GSK Holdings’ principal place of business was Pennsylvania, 126 which was
proposed in related litigation about the proper nerve center of GSK Holdings
Id. at 340–41.
Id. at 340.
Id.
Id. at 340–41.
Id. at 340, 342–43.
Id. at 342.
The holding company at issue in Johnson had been conducting short board
meetings in Wilmington, Delaware, quarterly since 2001, and the Johnson lawsuit was
filed on August 26, 2011. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id at 356; see also Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96 (2010) (reasoning
that “the “nerve center” test “points courts in a single direction, toward the center of
overall direction, control and coordination.”).
125. Johnson, 724 F.3d at 356.
126. Johnson, 724 F.3d at 349. The plaintiffs also argued that, when looking solely
at the activities of GSK Holdings, it was clear that GSK Holdings’ principal place of
business is located in Pennsylvania. Id. Based on all the evidence presented in the
case, the Third Circuit held that GSK Holdings’ activities of direction, coordination
and control took place in Wilmington, Delaware. Id. at 354–56.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
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and which was rooted in a series of opinions written by Judge Timothy J. Savage on the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania – Patton, 127 Maldonado, 128 and Brewer. 129 The plaintiffs argued that, when making
the principal place of business determination for GSK Holdings, the court
should have considered GSK LLC’s activities because GSK Holdings delegated its authority to manage GSK LLC to GSK LLC’s managers. 130
The Third Circuit acknowledged the plaintiffs’ proposed theory but did
not ultimately find it persuasive. 131 The Third Circuit held that the delegation
theory’s influence on the nerve center test ignores well-established precedent
that “a parent corporation maintains separate citizenship from its subsidiary
unless it has exerted such an overwhelming level of control over the subsidiary
that the two companies do not retain separate identities.” 132 The Third Circuit
also rejected Judge Savage’s reasoning in Brewer that “[w]here the sole member of a limited liability company is a holding company . . . [, the court is]
presented with an anomaly in applying the ‘nerve center’ test,” and should take
the limited liability company’s activities into consideration, despite the wellsettled principle that the citizenship of a limited liability company is determined by the citizenship of each of its members. 133
The Third Circuit concluded the corporate structure existing between
GSK Holdings and GSK LLC was “hardly anomalous” and further asserted
that holding companies are “ubiquitous, especially in large business enterprises,” and pre-Hertz courts “have been determining their nerve centers for
decades.” 134 As a result, the Third Circuit held the fact that a holding company
holds a limited liability company “does not, in itself, complicate the nerve center analysis” announced in Hertz. 135
Despite the foregoing conclusion, the Third Circuit concluded that the
dicta in Hertz, which cautioned courts to consider that a corporation’s nerve
center is normally “not simply an office where the corporation holds board
meetings,” was inapplicable when the corporation at issue is a holding company. 136 According to the Third Circuit, “the kind of board meetings denigrated in Hertz were being considered in the context of a case involving a

127. Patton ex rel. Daniels–Patton v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 2011 WL
6210724 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2011).
128. Maldonado ex rel. Maldonado v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 841 F. Supp. 2d
890 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
129. Brewer v. SmithKline Beacham Corp., 774 F. Supp. 2d 720 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
Brewer provided the core of the analysis of the two explanations provided. Johnson,
724 F.3d at 349 n.13 (citing Brewer, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 729–32).
130. Id at 349.
131. Id. at 352–53.
132. Id. at 351.
133. Id. at 351 (first and second alteration in original); see supra Section III.C.1.
134. Johnson, 724 F.3d at 351.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 347 (quoting Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93 (2010)).
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sprawling operating company with extensive activities . . . .” 137 In distinguishing the holding of the Court in Hertz, the Third Circuit noted that, when the
company at issue is merely a holding company, “relatively short, quarterly
board meetings may well be all that is required to direct and control the company’s limited work.” 138 It concluded that, in cases involving holding companies, “[t]he location of board meetings is . . . a more significant jurisdictional
fact . . . than it was in Hertz, and the meetings’ brevity does not necessarily
reflect an absence of substantive decision-making.” 139
Judge Thomas L. Ambro concurred in part and concurred in the judgment
but wrote a separate opinion because he feared the majority’s conclusion regarding the principal place of business of GSK Holdings was “in tension with
Hertz.” 140 Judge Ambro expressed skepticism that a corporation’s status as a
holding company must change the Hertz analysis. 141 Indeed, Judge Ambro
noted the Johnson majority did not point to any case endorsing its view that
sole reliance on the location of the board of directors meetings can properly
determine a holding company’s principal place of business. 142
Judge Ambro worried that the majority’s approach in Johnson “w[ould]
encourage parties to shift the location or formal authority of their corporate
boards in order to create citizenship where those board meetings are held.” 143
Further, Judge Ambro cautioned that “unless Hertz is changed or clarified by
the Supreme Court [of the United States], [the Third Circuit’s holding] sets an
incorrect precedent that will affect corporate citizenship rulings in future
cases.” 144 According to Judge Ambro, the nerve center test should “appl[y]
uniformly to all companies unless the Supreme Court [of the United States
says] otherwise.” 145

IV. INSTANT DECISION
Part IV examines several facets of the Ninth Circuit’s 3123 SMB LLC
decision. First, Section A dissects the majority opinion’s holding and reasoning, as authored by Judge Jacqueline H.N. Nguyen. Second, Section B analyzes the reasoning presented in Judge Andrew D. Hurwitz’s dissent.

Id. at 354 (quotations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 361 (Ambro, J., concurring). Judge Ambro believed that GSK Holdings’
principal place of business was located in the United Kingdom rather than Pennsylvania
or Delaware. Id.
141. Id. at 361–62. Judge Ambro said this was so even though the company at issue
in Hertz was an operating company. Id. at 362.
142. Id. at 362.
143. Id. at 364.
144. Id. at 361.
145. Id. at 364.
137.
138.
139.
140.
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A. The Majority Opinion
In 3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, the Ninth Circuit held – as a matter of first
impression – that, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, “a recently-formed
holding company’s principal place of business is the place where it plans to
hold its board meetings, regardless of whether any meetings have occurred
prior to filing a lawsuit, unless evidence shows that the corporation is directed
from elsewhere.” 146
The court reached this conclusion in three steps. First, the court set out
the well-established, general rules for determining corporate citizenship when
a lawsuit involves a limited liability company and a holding corporation. 147
Second, much like Prince Charming’s attempt in Disney’s Cinderella to find
his true love by conducting the “glass slipper test,” the Ninth Circuit sought the
“perfect fit” for the Corporation in 3123 SMB LLC by comparing its activities
to preexisting case law involving holding companies as well as companies otherwise deemed inactive. 148 Third, with the foregoing in mind, the court ultimately returned to the language of Hertz and, with Hertz as a guide, developed
its own approach for classifying the Corporation’s citizenship in 3123 SMB
LLC. 149

1. The Corporation and the LLC Have Distinct Legal Identities
At the outset, the Ninth Circuit echoed the well-established rule that,
“[f]or purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a limited liability company ‘is a citizen
of every state of which its owners/members are citizens.’” 150 Therefore, because the Corporation was the sole member of the LLC in 3123 SMB LLC, the
court concluded the Corporation’s citizenship was dispositive on the issue of
whether Horn and the LLC were diverse. 151
Applying the Johnson rule regarding the existence of an alter ego relationship 152 to the facts of 3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the identities, and therefore the citizenship, of the Corporation and the LLC

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, 880 F.3d 461, 468 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 465–67.
Id. at 467–68.
Id. at, 468–70.
Id. at 465 (quoting Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894,
899 (9th Cir. 2006)).
151. Id.
152. The citizenship of a holding corporation is separate and distinct from that of
its subsidiary limited liability company “unless it has exerted such an overwhelming
level of control over” the limited liability company. Id. at 467 (quoting Johnson v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 724 F.3d 337, 351 (3d Cir. 2013)); see supra Section
III.C.2.
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must be considered separate and distinct because no clear evidence supported
the view that the two companies were alter egos. 153

2. The Ninth Circuit’s Application of Hertz to Holding Corporation
and Inactive Corporation Precedent
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the appropriate method for determining a corporation’s citizenship is to apply the “nerve center” test established by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hertz, which stipulates that
a corporation’s principal place of business
should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters – provided that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, control, and coordination . . . and not simply an office where the
corporation holds its board meetings (for example, attended by directors
and officers who have traveled there for the occasion). 154

Because a holding company engages in low levels of activity by its very
nature, the Ninth Circuit classified such companies as “not normal” and looked
to how other jurisdictions have applied Hertz to corporations that have been
deemed atypical. 155 The Ninth Circuit spent considerable time analyzing how
the Third Circuit applied Hertz’s definition of corporate citizenship to a holding company in Johnson. 156 It concluded, however, that the Corporation at
issue in 3123 SMB LLC was even less active than the corporation analyzed in
Johnson, as it was a mere twenty-five days old on the date the lawsuit was filed
in federal court, and incorporating was the only business it had conducted in
that brief window. 157
The Ninth Circuit also looked at how other jurisdictions have applied
Hertz to the “somewhat analogous context” of corporations that are in the process of dissolving and are otherwise inactive. 158 Although the court acknowledged that the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Third and Eleventh “[C]ircuits
have [ruled] that a dissolved corporation has no principal place of business for
153. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 468. The Ninth Circuit suggested the Central
District of California may have erroneously believed that an alter ego relationship existed between the Corporation and the LLC because the two entities are both managed
by the Klings and utilize the same Missouri-based attorneys. Id.
154. Id. at 465 (alteration in original) (quoting Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77,
93 (2010)).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 465–66. The Ninth Circuit also analyzed how the First Circuit made a
finding of corporate citizenship involving a holding company in the pre-Hertz case of
Taber Partners, I v. Merit Builders, Inc., 987 F.2d 57 (1st Cir. 1993). 3123 SMB LLC,
880 F.3d at 466–67.
157. Id. at 467. The Corporation in Johnson, on the other hand, had held forty board
meetings at the time its lawsuit was filed. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
158. Id.
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diversity purposes[] and is therefore only a citizen of its state of incorporation,”
the Ninth Circuit recalled that it described the notions suggested by those circuits as logically “perverse” in a previous decision without taking a definitive
stance. 159 Even though the Ninth Circuit did not announce how it thought “inactive” corporations should be treated in a principal place of business inquiry,
it concluded, in stark opposition to the findings of the Central District of California, that “[the Corporation in 3123 SMB LLC], which doesn’t do much at
all, did nothing for [twenty-five] days.” 160

3. The Ninth Circuit’s Determination that the Corporation’s Principal
Place of Business is in Missouri
The Ninth Circuit next wrestled with crafting the citizenship classification
for the Corporation. The Ninth Circuit determined that the Corporation’s principal place of business was Missouri because the Corporation’s registered office, where annual board meetings were to be held, was in Clayton, Missouri. 161
The Ninth Circuit further held that this rule should control regardless of
whether any annual meetings have actually taken place at the time the lawsuit
is filed. 162
The Ninth Circuit determined the Central District of California’s holding
– that 3123 SMB put forth no evidence that Lincoln One’s operations were
directed, controlled, or coordinated from Missouri or anywhere other than California – rested on two improper assumptions: (1) “that a holding company’s
principal place of business is by default in the state where its officers live” and
(2) “that [a holding company’s] principal place of business can change over
time as the company holds a sufficient number of board meetings at its true
nerve center.” 163
First, the Ninth Circuit held that to assume “a holding company’s principal place of business is in the state where its officers reside is problematic”
because corporations are not typically directed from their officer’s homes. 164
159. Id. at 467; see also, e.g., Holston Invs., Inc. B.V.I. v. LanLogistics Corp., 677
F.3d 1068, 1071 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that such a rule “aligns most closely with
the Supreme Court[ of the United States’] analysis in Hertz”); Midlantic Nat’l Bank v.
Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 698 (3d Cir. 1995) (rejecting any notion that all corporations must
have a principal place of business). Although the issue of how an inactive holding
corporation should be treated for diversity purposes reached the Ninth Circuit in CoEfficient Energy Sys.v. CSL Industries, Inc., 812 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1987), the court in
3123 SMB LLC concluded the corporation at issue in that case was indeed active, as the
corporation’s director and sole shareholder “made business decisions, including the decision to contract with [the defendant] and file [that] action.” 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d
at 467 (first alteration in original) (quoting Co-Efficient Energy, 812 F.2d at 558)).
160. 880 F.3d at 468.
161. Id. at 471.
162. Id. at 468.
163. Id. at 469.
164. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit further reasoned that the place where a holding company’s
officers reside, without the accompaniment of a designated office space, is
problematic because Hertz requires that a corporation’s principal place of business “is a place within a State. It is not the State itself.” 165 Based on this
interpretation, the Ninth Circuit held the Central District of California erred in
finding the Corporation’s principal place of business to be California because
its inquiry failed divulge a single place within the State of California, such as
an office space, from which Mary Kling orchestrated the Corporation’s activities. 166 The Ninth Circuit further advised that a rule that looks to the state
where a holding company’s officers reside would be unworkable in most instances, as holding companies often have more than one decisionmaker living
in more than one state. 167
Second, the Ninth Circuit held that to assume “a corporation’s principal
place of business can shift over time without any change to the corporation’s
structure or operation” would invite more litigation and lead to the sort of
strange results the Supreme Court of the United States warned against in
Hertz. 168 The Ninth Circuit noted that although in 3123 SMB LLC the corporate entity was the plaintiff, it will be the defendant in many circumstances. 169
To hold that its principal place of business could change over time “would turn
on happenstance” – i.e., if a holding company had not held a sufficient number
of board meetings prior to being sued, then its citizenship would be determined
by the mere residence of one of its officers. 170
The Ninth Circuit advocated a separate reason in support of its holding
that a holding company’s principal place of business should be the place it
plans to hold its annual meetings: “administrative simplicity.” 171 The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that
[a] rule that forces courts to pick a nerve center from the potentially
several states where corporate decision-makers reside and to determine
whether there have been enough board meetings to establish a different
nerve center would be difficult to administer and generate unnecessary
litigation on collateral issues. In contrast, a rule presuming that from

165. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93
(2010)).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 94). In Hertz, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that “measuring the total amount of business activities that the corporation conducts there and determining whether they are significantly larger than the
next–ranking [s]tate” would lead to strange results because certain states have much
larger populations than others, which could throw off the analysis. Hertz Corp., 559
U.S. at 93–94.
169. 3123 SMB LLC, 880 F.3d at 469.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 469–70.
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inception a holding company directs its business from the place where
it holds its board meetings is easy to apply. 172

Notwithstanding its aforementioned holding, the Ninth Circuit noted the
record in 3123 SMB LLC included evidence from which an “inference [of jurisdictional manipulation] could be made.” 173 The Ninth Circuit admitted that
the Corporation’s timely incorporation – which occurred roughly one month
before the filing of this suit in federal court, near the end of the relevant statute
of limitations, and just before it brought separate claims arising from Horn’s
professional mistakes in parallel state court litigation – gave rise to concerns
of jurisdictional manipulation. 174 However, the court also noted the record
contained evidence suggesting the Corporation was incorporated in Missouri
for legitimate reasons, such as the Klings’ familial and business ties to Missouri
and the presence of their attorney in Missouri. 175
Ultimately, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction with the accompanying condition that upon remand
the district court was “free to consider whether there is jurisdictional manipulation or an alter ego relationship between [the Corporation] and [the LLC].” 176

B. The Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Judge Hurwitz argued that the Corporation’s “nerve center,” as determined at the time the lawsuit was filed, was California. 177 In Judge
Hurwitz’s view, the Central District of California correctly found that the Corporation’s nerve center was California because California was where the Corporation’s shareholders and directors resided. 178 Judge Hurwitz reasoned that
a holding company’s “‘nerve center’ cannot be in a state where the corporate
EEG is flat.” 179 Put another way, Judge Hurwitz emphasized that a corporation’s principal place of business cannot be “located in a state in which the
company ha[s] done absolutely no business at the time the [federal] lawsuit
was filed.” 180 Therefore, under Judge Hurwitz’s view, the fact that a board

172. Id. at 470 (citing Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 724 F.3d 337, 355
(3d Cir. 2013)). The court further cited that “[e]ven while cautioning courts to identify
a corporation’s actual center of direction and control, Hertz ‘place[d] primary weight
upon the need for judicial administration of a jurisdictional statute to remain as simple
as possible.’” Id. (quoting Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010)).
173. Id. at 470–71.
174. Id. at 471.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. (Hurwitz, J., dissenting).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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meeting was later held by the Corporation in Missouri should not have been
considered in making the jurisdictional determination in the instant case. 181
Judge Hurwitz wrote that the Central District of California’s finding that
the Corporation’s principal place of business was California was not clearly
erroneous because the LLC freely “conceded that there had been no corporate
activity in Missouri between the day [the Corporation] was incorporated and
the filing of [its] lawsuit.” 182 Even if the majority’s premise that the Corporation was completely inactive during the relevant period was adopted, Judge
Hurwitz reasoned that the district court’s dismissal must still be affirmed because the LLC “presented absolutely no evidence that any . . . direction, control, or coordination [of the Corporation] occurred in Missouri.” 183 In Judge
Hurwitz’s view, the majority improperly relied on Johnson for the proposition
that a holding company’s “nerve center” is where its board meetings are supposed to take place. 184 Judge Hurwitz found Johnson distinguishable because
the board meetings at issue therein had actually taken place in Delaware before
the lawsuit was filed. 185 In contrast, no board meetings had been held by the
Corporation in 3123 SMB LLC before the LLC filed its lawsuit. 186
According to Judge Hurwitz, the majority’s rule “gives rise to the very
dangers of jurisdictional manipulation that Hertz eschews.” 187 Judge Hurwitz
found it concerning that the majority’s analysis allowed for “[the Corporation],
having established diversity simply by virtue of its state of incorporation . . .[,]
[to] safely conduct its business entirely in California but still invoke the limited
jurisdiction of an Article III court.” 188

V. COMMENT
In 3123 SMB LLC, the Ninth Circuit decided the place where a holding
corporation merely anticipates holding its board meetings is sufficient to establish its principal place of business 189 – rendering itself the first circuit to provide a federal forum to a litigant on the basis of future intentions. In an unprecedented opinion, the Ninth Circuit determined a corporation’s “nerve center” could be located in a state where the corporation had conducted no business activity whatsoever – despite the fact that neither Hertz precedent nor the
leading persuasive authority from the Third Circuit in Johnson articulated such
a rule.

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See id. at 471–72.
Id. at 472.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 473.
Id.
Id. at 468.
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First, this Part argues the Ninth Circuit’s proposed “future board meetings” test for newly-formed holding corporations is problematic because it cuts
against the purpose of the diversity statute in a manner not anticipated by the
Supreme Court of the United States. Second, this Part argues the Ninth Circuit’s decision produces a result that is even further at odds with Hertz than the
Third Circuit’s Johnson decision. Finally, this Part argues the Ninth Circuit’s
holding effectively carves out a “holding company exception” to Hertz, 190 examines the long-lasting implications of 3123 SMB LLC, and explores the multiple avenues that could be pursued by the courts and/or the legislature to force
the problematic holdings announced by the Third and Ninth Circuits into compliance with Hertz precedent.

A. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in 3123 SMB LLC Defies the Purpose
of the Diversity Statute Beyond the Supreme Court of the United States
Anticipation
It is well-established that the purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to prevent
the potential for unfair prejudice when an out-of-state litigant is hailed to court
in a different state. 191 In determining whether prejudice exists, emphasis is
placed on the visibility of the corporation’s activities to the public. 192 If the
prejudice determination turns on the corporation’s visible activities to the public, then it is unlikely that the LLC at issue in 3123 SMB LLC would suffer a
risk of unfair prejudice if it was asked to litigate in California state court. Casting aside the legal reality that a limited liability company takes on the citizenship of each of its members for a moment, the LLC in 3123 SMB LLC is undoubtedly visible in California and has a principal place of business located in
California. Similarly, Horn is undoubtedly visible in California because he is
domiciled and maintains his law practice there.
The Supreme Court of the United States conceded in Hertz that anomalies
may exist even after the adoption of the “nerve center” test, producing “results
that seem to cut against the basic rationale” for the diversity statute. 193 The
Court reasoned that “accepting occasional[] counterintuitive results is the price
the legal system must pay to avoid overly complex jurisdictional administration . . . ,” and this result must be tolerated for the greater good. 194 However,
the consequence of the “future board meetings” principal place of business
standard for newly-formed holding corporations will be that an onslaught of
cases may yield counterintuitive results, far exceeding the “occasional” anomalous result that the Court was prepared to acknowledge in Hertz. Because the
holding corporation model is being pursued with more frequency in the twentyfirst-century business world and because lower federal courts clearly consider
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See supra note 10.
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 3624.
See id.
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96 (2010).
Id.
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the principal place of business of the holding corporation (when it is a member
of a limited liability company) as determinative of the limited liability company’s principal place of business, the primary purpose of the diversity statute
will be disregarded in more instances than originally anticipated by the Court
in Hertz if the Ninth Circuit’s holding is followed as precedent.

B. The Ninth Circuit’s Reliance on Johnson and Decision in 3123
SMB LLC Both Defy Hertz Precedent
The Third Circuit’s decision in Johnson is at odds with Hertz precedent
because it suggests that board meetings are somehow more jurisdictionally significant when the corporation at issue is a holding corporation. This analysis
seemingly endorses a reversion back to the multifactor, “flexible” tests applied
piecemeal by the federal courts in the pre-Hertz era, muddling the bright line
rule announced by the Court in Hertz. 195
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in 3123 SMB LLC is also at odds with Hertz
precedent and, in fact, takes the risky analysis presented in Johnson one step
further. While Johnson may have barely cracked open the door to treating the
holding of board meetings as sufficient to establish jurisdiction in the case of a
holding company, 3123 SMB LLC pushes that door wide open.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in 3123 SMB LLC meaningfully departs
from Hertz. The Ninth Circuit’s determination that corporate citizenship must
turn on wherever a corporation lists that it will hold board meetings is inconsistent with Hertz dicta and produces a perplexing result as a matter of policy.
If the corporate citizenship determination turns on the concept of the intended
location of board meetings– as the Ninth Circuit suggests – then it will be all
too easy for small-business-owner-plaintiffs to create a holding corporation by
filing the necessary and straightforward articles of incorporation in its desired
forum, write down that it intends to hold board meeting in its desired forum,
and secure its “principal place of business” in the state of its choosing.
In Hertz, the Court declared, “[T]he mere filing of a form, like the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Form 10-K listing a corporation’s ‘principal
executive offices’ would, without more, be insufficient proof to establish a corporation’s ‘nerve center.’” 196 The Hertz Court further emphasized that a corporation should not be permitted to establish citizenship in a place where it
“[has a] bare office with a computer” or hosts “an annual executive retreat.” 197
And yet, this is precisely what the Third Circuit allowed in Johnson and what
the Ninth Circuit further justified in 3123 SMB LLC when reasoning that the
weight of the Court’s cautionary language in Hertz is somehow less applicable
to holding corporation structures.

195. See supra text accompanying notes 80–86 (explaining the pre-Hertz tests for
principal place of business).
196. Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 97.
197. Id.
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The corporate citizenship inquiry must instead be based on where the corporation’s high level officers are actually controlling its activities at the time
the lawsuit is filed. It is unconvincing that the simple filing of articles of incorporation and listing of an address offer enough evidence of a corporation’s
genuine intent to conduct business in a particular state. These sorts of activities
are what the Court in Hertz rejected as being not enough, “without more,” to
establish a nerve center. 198 Similarly, the simple holding of a board meeting
should not be treated as sufficient evidence of a holding corporation’s intent to
conduct business in a particular state and should be placed in the category of
activities that are not enough, “without more,” to establish a “nerve center.”
Because a newly-formed holding corporation could easily hold a quick board
meeting immediately upon its incorporation, the concept of board meetings
cannot be the lynchpin of the principal place of business portion of the citizenship analysis. When courts attempt to discern an individual person’s domicile
for diversity of citizenship purposes, they focus not only on residence (i.e.,
where the individual is physically located) but also on the individual’s intent
to remain in the state as well. 199 The Court in Hertz announced a “nerve center”
test with a similar intent requirement for corporate citizenship – and its rule
rightfully placed significant emphasis on the intent of the corporation’s officers
and their location when decisions are made.
The intent of the corporation’s officers to conduct business in a particular
state should be properly discerned by looking to the primary purpose of the
corporation at issue, regardless of how that corporation is structured. If the
primary purpose of a corporation is to give direction to another company, as
was true of the Corporation at issue in 3123 SMB LLC, then the corporation’s
principal place of business must be where its high-level officers made management decisions at the time the lawsuit at issue was filed. This standard produces results that are consistent with the “nerve center” rule announced in
Hertz because it places emphasis on the brain power of the corporation and
points to a single place within a state.
In 3123 SMB LLC, the place where any and all decisions about the Corporation, as well as any direction it gave to the LLC, had been given at the time
the lawsuit was filed was California. California was where Mary Kling – the
Corporation’s only high-level officer – provided direct, day-to-day managerial
control of all Corporate activities, and the record was devoid of evidence that
she made any decision elsewhere. Therefore, in accordance with Hertz precedent, the Ninth Circuit should have found California the Corporation’s principal place of business for diversity purposes and denied the Klings a federal
forum.

198. Id. at 97.
199. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 60, § 3612.
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C. Implications of the 3123 SMB LLC Decision and Suggestions for
the Future
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in 3123 SMB LLC will have long-lasting effects on the federal court system. Its holding – that a recently-formed holding
company’s principal place of business is the place where it plans to hold its
board meetings, regardless of whether any meetings have occurred prior to filing a lawsuit – will cause the federal courts to be flooded with lawsuits. Business litigants seeking a more favorable forum may be tempted to create the
type of business arrangement blessed by the Ninth Circuit solely to take advantage of federal diversity jurisdiction.
The more significant effect of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is that it joins
the Third Circuit in articulating a faulty “holding company exception” to
Hertz. 200 The Ninth Circuit’s endorsement of the Third Circuit’s view that
holding companies should be treated differently than other forms of corporation’s under Hertz will result in a fracturing of precedent across the federal
circuits. Different courts will devise different tests to discern the citizenship
of complex businesses. This result will achieve the opposite of the administrative simplicity. Treating holding corporations as distinct from other types of
corporations may very well open the door to the court’s treatment of each and
every kind of complex corporate structure imaginable as uniquely situated in
the “nerve center” analysis. 201 Such an approach would allow the exception to
swallow the rule; the proposed exception would subvert the “nerve center” rule
and undermine the very certainty the Court sought to establish in Hertz.
There are several avenues that the courts and/or the legislature could pursue to rectify the holdings of the Third Circuit in Johnson and the Ninth Circuit
in 3123 SMB LLC. First, although it is likely the most unsatisfactory of all the
options described, Congress and the federal courts could wait for this line of
cases to reach the Supreme Court of the United States so that Hertz may be
clarified and a definitive answer regarding the principal place of business inquiry for holding corporations may be announced. Second, the courts could
announce a rule similar to the one announced by Judge Savage in Brewer that
LLC’s should not be treated as separate entities when their parent corporation
is a holding corporation. 202 For example, the courts could determine that if a
holding corporation and its limited liability company share the same business
activities and high level officers, the two companies should be presumed to
hold an alter ego relationship. The federal courts could carve out special treatment for holding corporation structures within the alter ego relationship theory
rather than carve out an exception to the Hertz holding.
200. See supra note 10.
201. See, e.g., Sawyer, supra note 66, at 653; see also Timothy J. Yuncker, Inactive

Corporations and Diversity Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. 1332(c): The Search for a
Principal Place of Business, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 815, 831 n.103 (1997).
202. Brewer v. SmithKline Beacham Corp., 774 F. Supp. 2d 720, 722 (E.D. Pa.
2011).
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As a third option, Congress could clarify a test for holding corporations
by statute. The Supreme Court of the United States has explicitly left to Congress the task of “accommodating our diversity jurisdiction to the changing
realities of commercial organization” if it sees fit to do so.203 Because holding
corporation business structures are increasing in popularity, Congress should
consider crafting a statutory rule for how citizenship is to be determined for
holding corporations and other atypical business organizations.

VI. CONCLUSION
After the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision of Hertz Corp. v.
Friend in 2010, a corporation’s principal business is its nerve center – its “center of direction, control, and coordination” – without exception. 204 When the
nerve center test is applied to a newly-created holding corporation, any conclusion that it is permissible to allow the corporation’s nerve center to be an office
where the corporation intends to hold its future board meetings – as suggested
by the Ninth Circuit in 3123 SMB LLC – defies Hertz precedent and allows
litigants to secure a federal forum based on distant hopes and loose plans. Consequently, a newly-formed holding corporation’s principal place of business
will reflect a deceptive center of control rather than the current location of its
control functions. This result is inconsistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and the
holding and reasoning in Hertz.
The dicta provided by the Court in Hertz – that mere board meetings are
not enough to establish a corporation’s principal place of business – should
govern the principal place of business determination for corporations, regardless of the specific type of corporate structure presented. A newly-formed corporation will often have its nerve center in the location where the corporation’s
officers and directors are making the decisions necessary to establish and grow
the business. Because this approach is consistent with the nerve center test
announced in Hertz and the desirable policy result of administrative simplicity,
the federal courts should apply this approach when determining a holding corporation’s principal place of business, and any notion that carving out a “holding company exception” to Hertz is an acceptable method of reconciling any
existing inconsistencies between Hertz’s “nerve center” test and the nature of
holding corporations should be emphatically rejected.

203. Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 724 F.3d 337, 348 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 197 (1990)).
204. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93 (2010).
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